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Learning from significant medical events: a systematic review 
Abstract 
Rationale, aims and objectives: Learning from significant medical events is a core 
component of quality and safety practice in healthcare worldwide. However, the 
evidence that analysis of, or reflection on, significant events has a positive impact on 
subsequent doctor performance is relatively sparse.  This review aims to explore the 
impact of undertaking significant event analysis on medical performance.  
Method: A systematic review using the following databases:  PubMed, EMBASE, 
Medline, PsycINFO and the Cochrane Collaboration Library. Citation searches were 
carried out on included studies.  Impact was defined according to a modified adaptation 
of the Kirkpatrick evaluation model. The selection and quality appraisal of studies was 
conducted by two reviewers, independently and blinded. Data were extracted from 
included studies related to: study type and location, population, methodology and 
intervention type.  
Results: Six papers met the inclusion criteria for this review. Of these: one reported 
learners’ reaction (Kirkpatrick 1); two reported modified attitudes (modified Kirkpatrick 
2a); five reported the acquisition of knowledge (modified Kirkpatrick level 2b); and all six 
identified reported changes in behaviour (modified Kirkpatrick level 3a). Significant 
event analysis is reported to identify gaps in knowledge, improve teamwork and 
communication, and encourage reflection leading to improvements in practice. Time, 
resources and team dynamics were identified as factors that impacted on the 
effectiveness of significant event analysis. Significant event analysis may benefit from 
suspending existing hierarchies during the process itself, and external facilitation.  
Conclusion: There is a lack of high quality evidence within the existing literature to 
ascertain the effectiveness of significant event analysis in the medical context. Existing 
studies are largely based on self-reported measures, which may reinforce the 
importance of the discursive process for practitioners. Future research could be directed 
at identifying the pedagogical processes that lead to changes in performance as a result 





At its core, person centred care is about providing healthcare services that take the 
needs and comfort of the patient as the primary concern and the focus for healthcare 
improvement. Ensuring patient safety, perhaps the most important aspect of person-
centred care, is now a top priority for most modern healthcare systems,[1] but this has 
not always been the case despite increasing evidence of adverse events through the 
1980s and 1990s.[2]  However in 1999, the Institute of Medicine in the United States 
published what is widely regarded as a seminal report into healthcare failings; To Err is 
Human highlighted how preventable medical errors were a significant cause of death 
and injury, exceeding the numbers of deaths attributed to vehicle accidents, breast 
cancer and AIDS.[3] The report argued for nationwide systems for collating incidents 
and for clinicians to take a role in their development. The report created “an 
international sense of urgency to reduce harm in healthcare delivery”,[2, p.1] and 
subsequently, incident reporting and analysis has been an increasingly prominent 
feature of quality and safety improvement systems, including throughout Europe.[4, 5]  
Adapted from procedures that had been developed in the aviation industry,[6] the basic 
rationale behind significant event analysis (SEA) is that, through carefully examining key 
events – usually those that could have or did lead to significant harm – learning can 
take place at both an individual and an organisational level to improve quality and 
safety.[7] Pringle et al.’s 1995 paper provides a workable and useful definition of SEA 
for this review:   
‘[SEA is where] individual cases in which there has been a significant 
occurrence…. are analysed in a systematic and detailed way to ascertain what 
can be learnt about the overall quality of care and to indicate changes that might 
lead to future improvements.’[8] 
This inclusive but specific interpretation of what constitutes SEA allows us to capture 
the broad range of activities that happen in different healthcare sectors. Often in primary 
care the focus will be on the actions and responses of an individual doctor in regard to a 
consultation or series of consultations with a specific patient.  In secondary care, a root 
cause analysis (RCA) may be undertaken with those involved in the event to ascertain 
the causes and the appropriate measures that need to be instigated. For the purposes 
of this review these processes are classified as SEA if they involve an individual doctor 
engaging with the process of reviewing a significant event for the purpose of identifying 
areas for improvement. This can be distinguished from audit whereby doctors compare 
more general practice (e.g. prescribing) against accepted standards within the field.  
The existing literature has tended to focus on the impact of SEA on the function of 
organisations, using outcomes measures such as mortality rates. Stavropoulou et al., 
have provided a comprehensive overview of the literature. While the authors found 
some evidence of change to clinical settings or processes as a consequence of 
establishing incident reporting systems, there was little evidence for improved 
outcomes. [9]   
However, regulatory developments, such as medical revalidation in the UK, are 
mandating that doctors provide evidence of engagement in SEA as part of their 
personal development, under the assumption that such engagement improves medical 
performance.[10, 11] Given such developments it is important to consider the current 
evidence base for the assumption that engaging in SEA improves doctor performance.   
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A further rationale for examining the evidence for the impact of SEA on doctor 
performance is that, despite being a well-established method of safety and quality 
improvement both in the UK and internationally [12, 13], SEA has also been subject to 
some recent criticism related to its role and function. Dodds and Kodate have argued 
that significant event analysis in the UK has undergone “institutional conversion”, a 
process by which the original role of SEA as a formative procedure to engender learning 
has mutated to a summative function used to grade healthcare organisations.[14] 
Dodds and Kodate point to the way in which data collected on significant events and 
“never events” – a prescribed list of events that are deemed both serious and avoidable 
such that they should never happen in a healthcare setting – are being collated and 
processed by the same institutional bodies that undertake NHS commissioning. This 
institutional conversion has resulted in a situation in which significant event reporting 
becomes a performance indicator for healthcare providers, working against the 
educational ethos behind SEA in which transparent reporting of significant events is the 
first step in the process of reflective learning.     
Amongst other criticisms, Macrae has argued that SEA requires infrastructure for 
routine and detailed investigation which, although well developed in the aviation 
industry, is not sufficiently developed in healthcare to deliver the same measures of 
success. As a result, in healthcare settings there is, according to Macrae, a tendency to 
prioritise quantity over quality in incident reporting. Like Dodds and Kodate, Macrae also 
points to the way in which the large volume of incident reporting is used a measure of 
safety rather than a process of learning. This creates a culture in which SEA becomes a 
“passive process”, in which staff see incident reporting as merely a way of logging 
problems and waiting for fixes, removing responsibility for local improvement.[4]  Others 
have pointed to the lack of evidence within the wider literature that SEA improves either 
practitioner performance or patient safety.[2, 15]  
Given the ongoing debate on the efficacy of the SEA, and in response to broader 
regulatory changes within medicine that are increasingly seeking to formalise and 
quality assure systems for reporting and analysing significant events, this review aims to 
assess the impact of SEA by addressing the following research questions:   
• RQ1: What impact does SEA have on doctor performance? 
• RQ2: What factors influence the effectiveness of SEA in the medical context?  
Methods 
This review follows a systematic approach based on the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) [16] and the Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination guidance.[17]  
Search Strategy 
The search strategy was developed using the PICO framework (see Table 1). This 
involved the development of a series of keywords and their synonyms related to the 
population, intervention and outcomes derived from the research questions. All search 
terms were reviewed by several members of the research team and assessed 
according to the Peer Review of Electronic Search Strategies (PRESS) guidance.[18]  
Authors sought the advice of an information specialist to develop a search strategy and 
the following databases were searched: Cochrane, EMBASE, Medline, PubMed, 
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PsycInfo.  Results were filtered for articles published after 2006 and in the English 
language.  
Table 1: Systematic review search terms 
Search strategy 
Population: anesthesiologist OR anesthesiologists OR anaesthesiologist OR 
anaesthesiologists OR anaesthetist OR anaesthetists OR “general practitioner” OR 
“general practitioners” OR “family practitioner” OR “family practitioners”  OR GP OR 
GPs OR obstetrician OR obstetricians OR  gynaecologist OR gynaecologists OR 
gynecologist OR gynecologists OR paediatrician OR paediatricians OR pediatrician 
OR pediatricians OR ophthalmologist OR ophthalmologists OR pathologist OR 
pathologists OR cardiologist OR cardiologists OR dermatologist OR dermatologists 
OR gastro-enterologist OR gastro-enterologists OR immunologist OR immunologists 
OR oncologist OR oncologists OR rheumatologist OR rheumatologists OR 
psychiatrist OR psychiatrists OR radiologist OR radiologists OR urologist OR 
urologists OR surgeon OR surgeons OR doctor OR doctors OR physician OR 
physicians OR consultant OR consultants OR specialist OR specialists OR locum 
OR locums Or clinician OR clinicians OR clinical OR “general practice” OR “primary 
care” OR “secondary care” OR clinic OR surgery 
AND 
Interest: “serious untoward incidents” OR “significant event” OR “significant events” 
OR “critical incident” OR “critical incidents” OR “never events” OR “serious untoward 
incidents” OR “serious untoward events” 
AND 
Outcome: “professional development” OR change OR improve OR quality OR 
learning OR reflect OR reflection OR impact OR outcome OR safety OR competence 
OR effective OR performance 
 
Study selection 
In the first stage of screening two reviewers independently examined the titles and 
abstracts from all returned articles after duplicates had been removed. Abstract 
screening was conducted using Rayyan, [19] a web-based application specifically 
designed for collaborative systematic reviews. Using this software, both reviewers 
conducted the screening independently (blind) and then worked through any conflicts 
together. If agreement could not be reached from reading the title and abstract, then the 
study was included for full text screening.  
During the second stage of screening the same two reviewers independently assessed 
full texts of the articles. Where agreement could not be reached, the article went to a 
third reviewer for input until a resolution could be achieved.   
Inclusion criteria 
In order to be included, studies had to meet the following criteria: published in the 
English language between the years 2006 and 2017; explore the impact of SEA on 
doctor performance; be of any study design except review articles (i.e. non-systematic 
reviews) or commentaries (Table 2).   
Exclusion criteria 
Studies that discussed the development of new tools or processes for analysis of 
significant events were only included if they revealed data on the impact of SEA more 
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generally. Given that the outcome measure for the review was medical performance, 
studies that focused on patient safety outcomes were only included if they linked directly 
to an assessment of the impact on medical performance; patient safety indictors were 
not taken as a proxy measure for medical performance as it was decided that any 
change in patient safety outcomes could just as likely be due to changes in protocols at 
the organisational level rather than specifically the performance of doctors.  Finally, due 
to the setting of interest, studies in the context of undergraduate medical education 
were excluded (Table 2).  
Table 2 Study inclusion criteria form 
Inclusion criteria form 
1. Is the study available in English? 
Yes (proceed)   No (reject) 
2. Is the study published between 2006 and 2017? 
Yes (proceed)    No (reject) 
3. Does the study report on the impact of SEA on medical performance? 
Yes (proceed)                                 No (reject)  
4. Is the study focused on SEA in the context of undergraduate medical 
education? 
Yes (reject)   No(proceed) 
Data extraction 
Data extraction was undertaken by one reviewer using a piloted extraction form. This 
was checked by a second reviewer with any necessary amendments being made. 
Information extracted included: year published; study location, aim and design; study 
population and sample methodology; and intervention type.  
Outcomes 
The specific outcome measure for RQ1 of this review was medical performance. After 
discussion with the review team, Barr at al.’s adaption of Kirkpatrick’s four-level 
evaluation model[20], which has been further modified by Overeem et al.[21], was used 
to evaluate all included study outcomes (Table 3). Decisions on which classification of 
Kirkpatrick’s hierarchy of evaluation were taken by two reviewers working together. This 
framework allows the results to be understood in terms of the nature of evidence 
provided, allowing for a more coherent and precise synthesis of research findings.  For 
RQ2, where studies had identified changes to doctor performance, we sought to identify 









Table 3:  Kirkpatrick's four level evaluation model as modified by Barr et al. (2000)[22] 
and Overeem et al. (2010).[21]  
Level Description 
Level 1: learners’ reaction 
 
Relates to participants’ views of their 
learning experience programme 
Level 2: learning outcomes  
2a: modification of 
attitudes/perception 
 
Changes in reciprocal attitudes or 
perceptions between participant groups, 
towards patients/clients and their condition, 
circumstances, care and treatment.  
 
2b: Acquisition of 
knowledge/skills  
 
Acquisition of concepts, procedures and 
principles of inter-professional 
collaboration or the acquisition of 
thinking/problem-solving, psychomotor and 
social skills linked to collaboration  
 
Level 3: Change in behaviour 
3a: Self-reported change in 
behaviour  
3b: Measured change in 
performance 
 
Behavioural change transferred from the 
learning environment to the workplace 
prompted by modifications in attitudes or 
perceptions, or the application of newly 
acquired knowledge/skills in practice.  
 
Level 4: Patient/Organisational 
outcomes 
 





4b: Benefits to patients/clients 
This relates to wider changes in the 
organisation/delivery of care, attributable to 
an education programme. 
 
Covers any improvements in the health 
and well-being of patients/clients as a 
direct result of an education programme. 
 
Quality assessment 
Quality assessment was undertaken independently by two reviewers. The Critical Skills 
Appraisal Programme (CASP) checklists for qualitative studies[23] and systematic 
reviews[24] were used for quality assessment. Quality assessment was important to 
assess the overall strength of findings for the review, but articles were not excluded on 
the grounds of their quality as conceptual relevance was deemed more important, 
especially given the limited literature available on this topic.  
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Data analysis and synthesis 
We followed Popay et al.’s modified narrative synthesis technique. This process of 
narrative synthesis (which can be distinguished from more general and non-systematic 
“narrative reviews”), is based on the premise that systematic synthesis of qualitative 
evidence can be presented in such a way that it tells a “trustworthy story” about the 
nature of evidence within the field of study. To achieve this, researchers develop a 
framework for analysis, undertake a preliminary synthesis, explore relationships 
between the data and assess – through quality appraisal – the robustness of the 
findings. Importantly, this process is not always sequential and researchers may, 
through an iterative process of collaboration, modify and adjust the parameters of their 
research, and even the research questions, as they learn more about the scope and 
nature of the available evidence.[25]  
Following these broad guidelines, we used accepted methods of thematic synthesis to 
analyse the data from the included studies,[26, 27] using a combined (inductive and 
deductive) approach.18 An overarching coding framework based on the two aspects of 
the research questions (the impact of SEA and factors influencing its impact) provided 
an initial scaffold of parent codes. Subsequently, an inductive approach was used to 
further populate the framework with more nuanced categories identified from the data. 
Through an iterative and collaborative process between two reviewers, the coding 
framework was modified as data was extracted and themes emerged. For RQ1, once 
the data was coded it was then mapped onto the adapted Kirkpatrick framework to 
determine the level at which change was taking place.     
Results 
Six studies met the inclusion criteria. The full process of study selection is provided in 
Figure 1. 
Study Characteristics  
Of the six studies that met the inclusion criteria, three related to primary care,[28-30] 
two to secondary care[6, 31] and one which covered both sectors.[7] The included 
studies in secondary care both focused on root cause analysis (RCA). One study was a 
systematic review of the published literature up until 2006. This review reported on 
studies in both primary and secondary care, although the majority of studies reported 
were from primary care.[7] Of the five original studies included: one was a review of 
significant event reports,[29] two used questionnaire surveys of, or including, practising 
doctors,[28] and two were based on semi-structured interviews with, or including, 
practising doctors.[30, 31]  
Given that SEA is a well-embedded system to assure the quality and safety of 
healthcare organisations,[4, 5] especially in secondary care, the small number of 
included studies is in itself worthy of comment.  A high number of studies in both 
primary care and secondary care were excluded because they focused on the 
organisational level, usually using patient outcome data to evaluate the impact of 
incident reporting systems. This literature has been comprehensively reviewed 
elsewhere.[9] Other excluded studies focused on the development of new procedures 
for incident reporting[13] or sought to assess the impact of a training programme to 
improve incident reporting processes,[32-34] but without sufficiently focusing on medical 
performance outcomes to meet our inclusion criteria. Some other studies, in both 
primary and secondary care, were expressly focused on barriers to effective incident 
8 
 
reporting processes, but without examining any change in medical performance 

























In summary, only a small number of articles met our inclusion criteria because the vast 
majority of recent studies on SEA do not focus on the impact of participation in SEA on 
doctors’ performance. 
RQ1: Impact of Significant Event Analysis on Doctor Performance  
Out of the six included studies: one reported learners’ reactions[7] (Kirkpatrick 1); two 
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Figure 1: PRISMA flow diagram 
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of knowledge[6, 7, 29-31] (modified Kirkpatrick level 2b) and all six identified reported 
changes in behaviour [6, 7, 28-31] (modified Kirkpatrick level 3a). No studies reported 
measured changes in behaviour (modified Kirkpatrick level 3b), changes to 
organisational practice (modified Kirkpatrick level 4a), or outcomes related to patient 
safety (modified Kirkpatrick level 4b). It is unsurprising that no studies reported changes 
to organisational practice (level 4), given that we excluded studies that used patient 
outcome metrics to measure changes to organisational performance.  
Applying the modified Kirkpatrick evaluation framework was not always straightforward. 
One of the issues that emerged was that some studies reported organisational changes 
(potentially modified Kirkpatrick level 4a), but this change was self-reported as opposed 
to measured, i.e. doctors involved in the study reported their belief that organisational 
change had occurred. After a closer reading of the modified Kirkpatrick framework and 
subsequent discussion between reviewers (TP and RB), it was agreed that such 
reporting constituted a level 3a and that outcomes would have to be measured to qualify 
for a level 4.  
In light of this, we classified the systematic review as 1, 2a, 2b and 3a, and not level 4, 
as the evidence reviewed, in the main, came from studies based on the identification of 
learning needs and self-reported change. Where the review discussed changes to 
patient care and service delivery (level 4), it suggested that the studies from which this 
was drawn were based on self-reported measures, e.g. “SEA is reported to have 
facilitated multiple changes in practice and important improvements in service 
quality”.[7, p.523] 
Learners’ reaction (Kirkpatrick Level 1) 
This level of Kirkpatrick framework is for those findings that relate to personal reactions 
to engaging in SEA but in situations whereby those reactions are not directly linked to 
improved learning or behaviour. Only the systematic review by Bowie et al. reported 
findings on this level. On the one hand, the review found that engaging with SEA, 
provided “an element of personal catharsis…for some, especially in writing up the 
report”. On the other hand, they also found that it could engender reactions related to, 
“a fear of litigation, exposure, reprisal or humiliation”. The “critical process” of SEA was 
reported as being sometimes “disconcerting”, which could “release un-containable 
pressures”.[7, p.523]  
Modification of attitudes / perception (modified Kirkpatrick Level 2a) 
Studies reporting on changing attitudes as a result of SEA described such changes in 
quite general terms.  One study into the use of RCA in Iranian hospitals found that RCA 
could lead to an “attitude change among healthcare workers towards safer improvement 
strategies”.[31, p.157] Similarly, the systematic review into SEA found that it could lead 
to “a greater commitment to change” amongst and could “generate greater confidence 
and higher levels of personal trust” amongst staff.[7, p.523]  
Acquisition of skills / knowledge (modified Kirkpatrick Level 2b) 
Engaging in SEA was reported as identifying gaps in knowledge and learning needs of 
both individual practitioners[7, 29, 30] and teams.[31] 95.3% (n=182) of the significant 
event reports analysed by McKay et al. found that learning needs were identified in the 
reports themselves. These related to: general awareness of personal issues, 
responsibilities and change (51.3%, n=98), clinical knowledge (15.7%, n=30), the use of 
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equipment and workspace (13.6%, n=26), and medication/prescribing (4.7%, n=9).[29, 
p.67]  
General Practitioner participants in the study by Rea and Griffiths had commented on 
the “emotive value” of SEA that “enabled them to personally reflect on their mistakes” 
and that “learning from deviations in care” was the “over-riding purpose for reporting 
and analysing incidents”.[30, p.5] Similar findings were reported in secondary care with 
81% (n=36) of respondents in Abdi and Ravaghi’s study into RCA in Iranian hospitals 
“believed that the process of going to the root of a problem”, enabled doctors to 
“develop a new understanding” and to “challenge taken-for-granted assumptions”.[31, 
p.156]  
Self-reported changes in behaviour (modified Kirkpatrick level 3a) 
Studies gave mixed results on self-reported changes to behaviour as a result of 
engaging in SEA, although all recognised some positive change.   
Three studies reported changes to clinical practice.[7, 28, 29] SEA was reported to have 
“facilitated multiple changes to practice and important improvements in service 
quality”.[7, p.523] 91% (n=29) of the participants in the study by Abdi and Ravaghi 
described RCA as a “valuable tool for improving work practices”.[31, p.156] The study 
by McKay et al., which analysed significant event reports in primary care delivered 
similar findings, with 81% of those reports (n=154) demonstrating that “change(s) had 
been agreed and implemented by at least one member of the primary care team as a 
result of SEA”. These changes related to disease diagnosis and management, (16.6, 
n=32), doctors’ personal skills/behaviour/knowledge application (14.6%, n=28), and 
communication (13.6%, n=26).[29, p.65] This is supported by a similar study by de Wet 
et al., in which 85% of respondents (n=93) reported that engaging in SEA had resulted 
in a change in practice.[28, p.1210] 
In addition to the McKay et al. study, three of the other included studies specifically 
reported that SEA had improved teamwork and communication.[6, 7, 31] Participants in 
the study by Abdi and Ravaghi expressed a “common belief” that root cause analysis 
“provides an opportunity to improve teamwork and communication by bringing staff from 
different disciplines together to discuss system vulnerabilities”.[31, p.156] This finding 
was supported in the study by Braithwaite, who found that 80.3% (n=200) of 
respondents reported that RCA improved teamwork, and 79.8% (n=201) that it 
improved communication about patient care.[6, p.395] 
Similarly, Bowie et al. describe the role of SEA in bringing together the “the wider team 
to contribute to decision making when resolving problems and conflicts, which may lead 
to staff feeling valued and successful change being sustained.” In particular, the authors 
argue that a “focus on team dynamics may encourage a shift from an individualistic view 
of practice to a broader teams-based perspective”.[7, p.522] 
Other findings related to the role of SEA in providing an opportunity for both individual 
[29, 30] and team reflection.[7] Similarly, the study by McKay et al. found “further 
evidence” that SEA “provided an opportunity for reflection”, but warned that, “much of 
the learning would appear to be personal to the SEA report author” rather than the wider 
clinical team.[29, p.70] In contrast, the systematic review by Bowie et al. reported 
evidence that SEA provided, “an opportunity for the team to reflect that may generate 
greater confidence and high levels of personal trust”.[7, p.522] In considering the 
difference in findings between these two studies, it is worth noting that the methodology 
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for the McKay et al. study was a content analysis of SEA reports, so it is difficult to see 
how this methodology could have delivered any robust findings relating to the reflection 
of anyone other than the report author. 
Although, as noted above, some studies had reported negative emotional reactions to 
engaging with SEA, none of the included studies reported negative changes to 
behaviour e.g. defensive clinical practice. 
RQ2: Factors that influence the impact of significant event analysis on medical 
performance: Team dynamics, leadership and resources 
Four of the seven included studies reported on the factors that influenced the impact of 
SEA on doctor performance.[6, 7, 30, 31] All four of these reported team dynamics and 
leadership as a prominent factor. This was the case in both primary care[7, 30] and 
secondary care (RCA).[6, 31]  
Established and cohesive teams can aid in the process of SEA if there is a “high degree 
of trust and openness” and a “supportive and open working environment” to facilitate 
open discussion. [7, p.524] However, SEA may not always be conducted with the whole 
team, thus hindering team reflection.[30] Poor team dynamics may also “militate against 
the critical appraisal of the care delivered”.[7, p.523] In particular, poor team dynamics 
can be attributed to existing hierarchies whereby more junior team members may be 
reluctant to challenge the interpretation of events proffered by their senior colleagues.[7, 
31] This in turn may lead to a situation of “group think”, whereby a team consensus is 
arrived at, not because it is the most valid interpretation of events, but “because of the 
number or seniority of those that expressed it”.[31, p.154] As a result, the process of 
SEA should be one in which hierarchy is suspended,[7] should include both clinical and 
non-clinical staff,[31] and could benefit from regular meetings and external facilitation, 
provided any such facilitator is appropriately trained.[7]    
An equally prominent factor in the included studies was that of time and resources. In 
the case of RCA, 78% (n=25) of participants in the study by Abdi and Ravaghi 
expressed that gathering sufficient information was the most challenging aspect of 
conducting RCA.[31, p.153]  This finding was supported by Braithwaite et al., who found 
that 75% (n=189) of respondents stated that a lack of sufficient time allocated to RCA 
hindered its effectiveness and “always or sometimes occurred.”[6, p.395] This is often 
coupled with a more general lack of resources that hinders not only the investigation 
into significant events,[6] but also the implementation of resulting strategies.[31]      
This was also the case in primary care, where the “busyness of general practice” and 
the priority accorded clinical work sometimes means that insufficient time is available for 
SEA.[30, p.5] This in turn can lead to a lack of continuity because meetings to discuss 
significant events do not always have the relevant staff members in attendance.[7]  
Other factors impacting on the effectiveness of SEA include a fear of blame or litigation, 
which may prevent doctors from reporting events in the first place,[30] and the need for 
effective training in both identifying and reporting significant events.[7]   
Six out of nine GPs interviewed for the study by Rea and Griffiths stated that the 
requirement to reflect on significant events within their appraisal motivated doctors to 
produce reports and that the appraisal process itself encouraged a culture of openness 
around significant event reporting.[30]   
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Quality appraisal  
The studies were of generally medium quality, with the systematic review being low 
quality due to a lack of rigour in reporting the search protocols. Moreover, even where 
one study was of a higher quality, the outcome measure of doctor performance was not 
its main focus. Accordingly, the conclusions are drawn from a relatively weak evidence 
base. 
Summary of findings and Discussion  
• RQ1: What impact does SEA have on doctor performance? 
In 2008 Bowie et al. described a “faith-based assumption” that “engagement in SEA has 
positive benefits”. SEA was popular, not because it is demonstrably efficacious in terms 
of improving doctor performance, but because it “is educationally attractive with high 
face validity”.[7, pp.524-525] The results of this review suggest that this conclusion may 
still be valid. The low number of studies that met the inclusion criteria suggest that 
research into SEA has not generally been focused on its impact on doctor performance. 
The lack of high quality studies adds further weight to the argument that it is an under-
researched area in the evaluation of clinical practice.  
In categorising evidence according to a modified Kirkpatrick framework, we can also 
see that the changes in medical performance as a result of engaging in SEA are self-
reported rather than measured, indicating that there is also scope for developing 
research methodologies that would seek to use some kind of performance indicators to 
objectively measure the impact of SEA. However, it should also be recognised that this 
would not be a simple endeavour. SEA does not lend itself to the development of the 
kind of proxy measures of performance that can, and have been used effectively to 
measure the effects of other interventions. In the case of audit and feedback for 
example, prescribing levels or guideline adherence can be used to ascertain changes to 
professional practice.[37] Whereas in the case of SEA, there are no obvious measures 
of performance, or proxy measures, that could easily distinguish between organisational 
and individual level outcomes. 
There is also a lack of evidence in the literature relating to how SEA works. The 
assumption that SEA improves performance, which is common in the wider literature, is 
related to the idea that it improves reflection[8, 29] and that its benefits are, for example, 
“probably linked to adult learning theory.”[38, p.735] Yet this review shows that there is 
a lack of theory-driven research into how SEA actually works to produce its effects, and 
what these effects are in terms of clearly measured outcomes of medical performance. 
However, our findings also do not provide any evidence to refute the hypothesis that 
SEA improves doctor performance. The fact that the included studies highlighted self-
reported changes to behaviour support the idea that those working in the field of 
medicine value the process of reflecting on incidents that occur in the workplace, which 
is supported more generally in the literature.[39, 40] Doctors also perceive SEA to be 
useful in highlighting deficiencies in skills, knowledge and improving teamwork and 
interpersonal skills. This evidence should not be discounted, but at the same time we 
should recognise that there is scope for more robust research into how SEA works and 
how it affects performance. Given the difficulties, described above, in determining  clear 
and appropriate outcomes measures for SEA, future research may derive its robustness 
from qualitative methodologies and through linking research findings to theories of 
learning and pedagogy.    
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• RQ2: What factors influence the effectiveness of SEA in the medical context? 
Where SEA is shown to be valued by those that engage in it, it is most effective when 
the process is accorded sufficient time and resources, and when there are good team 
dynamics and effective leadership. However, it is not clear from these studies what kind 
of resources are most critical, or exactly what effective leadership looks like. Moreover, 
if SEA becomes a more resource intensive process, it runs the risk of deterring 
practitioners from engaging with it. More research into best practice in SEA would 
therefore be useful.  
The identification of team dynamics and leadership as facilitating SEA also poses a 
practical challenge in understanding how SEA works. Those teams with better dynamics 
and effective leadership will likely have less significant events in the first place and, 
correspondingly, poor team dynamics and leadership might be identified, through an 
effective SEA process, as being a cause of the events in question.[13]   
A further challenge to understanding SEA is that the term itself may mean different 
things in different sectors or organisations. In the UK, SEA in primary care (family 
medicine) is more likely to be conducted by an individual practitioner and may include 
not only adverse incidents in which patient safety is compromised, but also positive 
outcomes. Whereas in secondary care, SEA is more likely to be conducted in teams, 
often as a RCA, and is focused specifically on adverse events that did or could have 
compromised patient safety. It may be that one model does not fit different sectors, but 
greater terminological clarity in terms of the process undertaken would aid in the 
evaluation of effectiveness.  
SEA has also been identified as being dependent on effective processes of incident 
investigation that require a suspension of hierarchy in which participants have an equal 
input, regardless of their position within the organisation, and an atmosphere in which 
participants do not fear that they will attract blame when highlighting their own mistakes. 
This is particularly relevant in the current policy context in the UK, with the suggestion 
that a culture of blame and fear is pervasive in NHS institutions.[41]  
This also speaks to some of the concerns that have been raised in relation to significant 
incident reporting in the UK whereby reporting systems have been accused of being 
subverted from their educational purpose in order to provide performance metrics for 
healthcare organisations.[4, 14]  Our review suggests that, if SEA improves 
performance, it does so because, as Leistikow and colleagues put it, the “journey, not 
the arrival, matters”.[12, p.1] In particular, while individual reflection within performance 
appraisal may provide an incentive to engage in SEA, the evidence suggests it is the 
discursive process, within and between members of a team, which is most valued by 
participants and perceived to change behaviour. This supports the argument posited by 
Vincent, that linking SEA to root cause analysis is unhelpful because the latter is a 
“gross oversimplification” of the process. There is rarely, argues Vincent, a single cause 
of an event, so if SEA is to be effective it should be a “window on the system” not a 
retrospective search for root causes.[42]  
This argument resonates with some of the wider literature on organisational 
development which warns against processes that focus solely on diagnostics at the 
expense of dialogue.[43] In terms of policy implications, these findings would therefore 
support efforts to develop more systems-focused SEA processes such as the Enhanced 
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Significant Event Analysis programmes that have been trialled by NHS Education for 
Scotland.[44]   
However, if the aim of SEA is to create an open conversation about incidents that occur 
in healthcare organisations, then there is a difficult balance to be struck: measuring the 
performance of healthcare organisations in terms of incidents that occur may be 
important in highlighting institutional failings, but may in turn work against the 
development of an open culture in which practitioners candidly report and reflect on 
mistakes. This dilemma is important and somewhat paradoxical when viewed from a 
person-centred care perspective. As a means of ensuring patient safety, it may seem 
reasonable to make a judgement about the overall effectiveness of a healthcare 
provider by examining data on the significant events that occur within that organisation. 
However, this may undermine the capacity of SEA to induce improved performance by 
individual doctors by dis-incentivising full and candid engagement with the process, with 
potentially negative consequences for patients.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
This review benefits from a rigorous systematic methodology. The modified Kirkpatrick 
framework has enabled us to delineate the nature of the evidence provided in the 
literature. The main limitation of this review is the lack of high quality studies and the 
absence of clear and objective outcome measures to ascertain impact on medical 
performance. However, this is mitigated somewhat by the quality appraisal and the use 
of the Kirkpatrick framework as we have been able to evaluate the strengths of the 
claims we are making. Limiting the search to English language literature, while a 
practical necessity, may mean that we have missed some relevant studies.  
Conclusion 
There is a lack of high quality evidence within the existing literature to ascertain the 
effectiveness of SEA to improve doctor performance. The existing evidence is largely 
based on self-reported measures, suggesting that it is a process valued by those that 
engage in it, but that its efficacy is based on assumptions rather than evidence. Benefits 
are reported as relating to improved teamwork and interpersonal skills and the provision 
of opportunities for reflection.  SEA is perceived to be most effective when there are 
good team dynamics and when it is accorded sufficient time and resources. Effective 
leadership is deemed important but hierarchy is unhelpful in the process of investigating 
the causes of significant events. Future research could be directed at developing a 
more comprehensive and theoretically informed understanding of the pedagogical 
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